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A B S T R A C T
This article leverages a case study of a recent Chinese acquisition in the United Kingdom to explore the up-
grading of capabilities in the subsidiaries in developed countries acquired by emerging market multinational
enterprises (EMNEs). The seemingly implausible upgrading phenomenon is explained by the EMNEs’ com-
plementary assets, their GVC lead ﬁrm positions and the unique power relationship between the acquirer and
acquired ﬁrms, which enable the EMNEs to ‘impel’ upgrading and encourage ‘co-learning’ in their acquired
subsidiaries. The contributions to the literature on EMNEs, global value chains, and organizational learning are
outlined and discussed.
1. Introduction
There has been a recent surge in research on the outward foreign
direct investment (OFDI) activities undertaken by emerging economy
multinational enterprises’ (EMNEs), including their acquisitions made
in developed countries (Buckley et al., 2007; Tung, 2007, 2017; Gubbi,
Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010; Hennart, 2012; Williamson &
Raman, 2011). Most of the research on EMNE acquisitions in developed
countries has focussed on their knowledge-seeking motives and on how
parent ﬁrms acquire strategic assets to enhance their own capabilities
and competitiveness (for example, see Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi,
2015; Gubbi et al., 2010; Hansen, Fold, & Hansen, 2016; Meyer & Peng,
2016; Yang & Deng, 2017). Indeed, the emergent view is that EMNEs
adopt a ‘light touch’ approach to their western acquisitions (e.g., Liu &
Woywode, 2013) so as not to disrupt the superior capabilities of the
acquired targets.1 However, we know very little about whether and
how the acquired advanced ﬁrms also beneﬁt in terms of capability
upgrading and learning (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Rui,
Cuervo-Cazurra, & Un, 2016). This paper seeks to ﬁll this void, taking
advantage of a rare access to both an EMNE parent ﬁrm and its acquired
subsidiary in a developed country.
The Global Value Chain (GVC) literature acknowledges that up-
grading is aﬀected by the governance structure of and power relation-
ships in the value chains. However, in this literature, ﬁrms are largely
treated as black boxes (Kadarusman & Nadvi, 2013), with little un-
derstanding of ﬁrm-level learning in the upgrading process (Morrison,
Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti, 2008; Hansen et al., 2016). In addition, in both
the management and GVC literatures, the empirical narrative is domi-
nated by the subsidiaries or suppliers of developed economy MNEs
(DMNEs) (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005;
Corredoira & McDermott, 2014; Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2011; McDermott
& Corredoira,2010), with very little being said about upgrading in
EMNE subsidiaries. Above all, the extant literature has a contextual bias
towards developing country ﬁrm upgrading and provides a rather static
and unidirectional view of capability upgrading, focussing on its ante-
cedents but lacking a multidirectional understanding of subsidiary up-
grading during and after the acquisition. Based on the above, this paper
aims to answer the following research question: how and why can sub-
sidiary ﬁrms in developed countries upgrade their capabilities under emer-
gent acquirers?
In this paper, we cross-engage diﬀerent disciplinary strands to
achieve a deeper understanding of upgrading in EMNE acquired sub-
sidiaries. In particular, we draw upon the GVC, international business
and organizational learning literatures to unlock the ‘black box’ of the
upgrading process, paying special attention to the underlying learning
process and the role played by the EMNE parent ﬁrms.
This research is based on the case study of a recent Chinese acqui-
sition in the United Kingdom (UK). The results demonstrate that mul-
tiple types of capability upgrading (product, process, functional, and
inter-sector) had taken place in the subsidiary. The underlying learning
process reveals a dual role played by the EMNE acquirer ﬁrm, that of an
‘impeller’, which was associated with its global value chain lead ﬁrm
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position and complementary assets, and that of a ‘co-learner’, which was
associated with EMNE ‘liability of emergingness’ (Madhok & Keyhani,
2012) and with the relatively balanced power relationship between the
acquirer and acquired ﬁrms.
This paper makes a number of contributions. Empirically, it re-
sponds to the call for ‘phenomenon-based research’ (Doh, 2015) by
presenting a detailed study of the seemingly unlikely phenomenon of
the upgrading of capabilities occurring in a technologically advanced
ﬁrm in a developed country after it had been acquired by an EMNE.
This paper contributes to the study of EMNEs in a number of ways. In
particular, it reveals how an EMNE can leverage its unique capabilities,
strategies, and GVC lead ﬁrm position and shape the upgrading process
in an acquired, technologically advanced subsidiary in a developed
country. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this study is one of the
ﬁrst to examine the much needed learning eﬀect and development
impact of EMNE investments in developed countries (Buckley, Doh, &
Benischke, 2017; Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Luo & Tung, 2017;
Rui et al., 2016). In addition, it contributes to the study of EMNE power
(Sinkovics, Yamin, Nadvi, & Zhang, 2014). The contribution made by
the EMNE acquirer ﬁrm as a source of knowledge and learning in a
global value chain and the power it exercised in the upgrading process
challenge the conventional wisdom that sees EMNEs as mere learners
and beneﬁciaries of knowledge transfer from developed economies.
This paper also contributes to the GVC and organizational learning
literatures by building a connection between ﬁrm-level learning and
upgrading outcomes but also by revealing how the learning process is
induced and shaped by ﬁrm strategies and characteristics.
2. Theoretical foundations
2.1. Capability upgrading
Subsidiary evolution is a persistently key topic in international
business and strategy (e.g., Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Cantwell &
Mudambi, 2005; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009; Enright & Subramanian,
2007). Much of the subsidiary evolution literature, however, has tended
to narrowly focus on the visible mandate of the subsidiary—with an
emphasis on change in the hierarchy of roles or functions such as
marketing, production, and development—or a simple two stage man-
date evolving from competence-exploiting to competence-creating
(e.g., Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Collinson & Wang, 2012;
Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006, 2016; Schmid & Schruig, 2003).
The extant subsidiary evolution literature has therefore tended to
reduce subsidiary development to a change in the charter or mandate of
the subsidiary without much discussion of its underlying capabilities. In
this study, in order to capture capability development in a more com-
prehensive fashion, we adopted the capability upgrading deﬁnition
given in the GVC literature. This literature speciﬁes four types of up-
grading: product upgrading, by which ﬁrms move into more sophisti-
cated product lines, thus increasing unit values; process upgrading, by
which ﬁrms enhance their eﬃciency by re-organising their production
processes or by introducing superior technologies; functional upgrading,
by which ﬁrms climb to new functional areas in the value chain, such as
design or marketing; and inter-sector upgrading, by which ﬁrms move
horizontally into new sectors involving new production activities that
exploit their existing competences (Giuliani, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti,
2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002a). We believe that the GVC litera-
ture’s deﬁnition of capability upgrading enables a more comprehensive
understanding and examination of the phenomenon, aﬀording the
ability to capture capability development beyond functional upgrading.
2.2. Learning, subsidiary capability upgrading, and EMNEs
In the discourse of the GVC literature, upgrading involves organi-
zational learning to improve the positions of ﬁrms in global production
networks (Gereﬃ, 1999). Developed against the backdrop of increasing
DMNE lead ﬁrm outsourcing of peripheral and often low-value activ-
ities to developing countries, the GVC literature views the capability
upgrading of ﬁrms and industries in developing countries as the result
of learning opportunities exploited by local producers inserted into
global value chains via DMNE lead ﬁrms that are assumed to possess
superior technologies and knowledge (Gereﬃ, 1999; Marin & Giuliani,
2011). The idea is that both upgrading and knowledge transfer are af-
fected by the governance structures of the value chains; i.e., the nature
of the relationships that exist among the various value chain partici-
pants.
The classic GVC frameworks place governance structures on a
continuum of relationships between global lead ﬁrms and other value
chain participants—one that ranges from loose to very tight, with
arm’s-length market relations at one extreme and hierarchical ones at
the other—with two or three more network-based governance struc-
tures in between. The GVC literature further argues that these gov-
ernance structures dictate what, how, when, and how much is pro-
duced, oﬀering diﬀerent upgrading opportunities to local producers
connecting with GVCs (Gereﬃ, 2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002a).
Lead ﬁrms may, for example, set and enforce product parameters and
monitor compliance to process standards (Humphrey & Schmitz,
2002b). They may also exercise their ‘normative power’ by “shaping
expectations of how business should be organised, how quality should be
assessed, or guidelines to be followed” (Gereﬃ & Lee, 2016, 28). A key
tenet of the GVC literature is that lead ﬁrm power and the way it is
exercised vary in diﬀerent governance structures, implying diﬀerent
upgrading prospects for other value chain participants. Indeed, a large
volume of empirical studies has documented upgrading success and
failure in diﬀerent governance structures and various in-
dustries—including apparel, automotive, horticulture, and electronics
(see, for example, Gereﬃ, 1999; Marin & Giuliani, 2011; Sturgeon,
2002; Tokatli, 2007).
The aforementioned insights notwithstanding, the GVC literature
suﬀers from a lack of understanding of the ﬁrm-level learning processes
that underpin the upgrading outcomes (Hansen et al., 2016), and the
extant literature tends to “reduce learning to the transfer of speciﬁc kinds
of technological know-how or knowledge about technologies and products”
(Herrigel, Wittke, & Voskamp, 2013, 111). Above all, much of that
literature has focussed on the upgrading processes found in DMNE-
dominated value chains (e.g., Corredoira & McDermott, 2014; Ivarsson
& Alvstam, 2011; Khan & Nicholson, 2015; Marin & Giuliani, 2011;
Sturgeon, 2002; Tokatli, 2007). Little attention has been paid to the
upgrading of participants in EMNE-led value chains in spite of the fact
that we may, however, observe diﬀerent upgrading mechanisms there
because of the EMNEs’ unique characteristics and of the diﬀerent power
relationships found in such value chains. Below, we review studies from
some cognate disciplines to gauge a way of solving these issues.
In our eﬀort to establish a link between ﬁrm-level learning and
upgrading, we were particularly inspired by some recent studies. For
example, in their study of technological upgrading in foreign sub-
sidiaries in Thailand, Hobday and Rush (2007) paid particular attention
to ﬁrm-level motivations, barriers, and inducements to upgrading, as
well as to decision-making in subsidiaries. Investigating how a Chinese
ﬁrm upgraded to a lead ﬁrm position in the global biomass power plant
industry through international acquisition, Hansen et al. (2016) studied
the micro-level dynamics of technological changes in ﬁrms—including
the establishment of R&D units, the recruitment of engineers, and the
establishment of experience-collection procedures—at the same time,
observing the social conditions for knowledge transfer—including
working practices, and trust and communication patterns. Herrigel
et al. (2013) studied upgrading in supply chains in the automotive and
machinery sectors with an emphasis on mutual learning processes in
upgrading, which may involve ‘communities of practice’ (Brown &
Duguid, 1991) and collective reﬂection and experiment. In the spirit of
these previous studies, we ﬂoated the idea that upgrading involves
organizational learning to improve the position of ﬁrms in global
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production networks (Gereﬃ, 1999). In our pursuit of the learning
processes that underpin capability upgrading, we have drawn upon the
organizational learning literature, which recognizes that learning can
involve changes in behaviours/actions (e.g., Argote & Hora, 2017;
Aranda, Arellano, & Davila, 2017; Easterby-Smith, Crossan, & Niccolini,
2000; Lyles & Salk, 1996). This literature also emphasises that learning,
rather than being a unilateral process involving the transfer of ‘discrete
nuggets of knowledge or technology’ from one ﬁrm to another, is likely
to encompass mutual relations between ﬁrms (Herrigel et al.,
2013).Yet, changing behaviours/actions and mutual learning, and how
these inﬂuence the upgrading of capabilities in cross-border EMNE
acquisitions, remain underexplored.
The sparsely researched upgrading of capabilities in EMNE-acquired
subsidiaries in developed countries requires a careful examination of
EMNE characteristics and of the speciﬁc power relationships found in
their value chains. To start with, unlike their DMNE counterparts,
EMNEs may not own superior knowledge. Indeed, EMNEs are tradi-
tionally perceived to lack ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages and knowledge-
based capabilities (e.g., Dunning, Kim, & Park, 2008; Rugman, 2010).
Some recent studies, however, have challenged this view and have ar-
gued that many EMNEs do have ownership advantages and unique in-
novative capabilities involving, for example, the novel use of existing
technologies, new business models and processes, and new ways of
merging diﬀerent technologies (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti,
2014; Kumar, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2017; Yin & Williamson, 2011).
Others have argued that some EMNEs have developed ‘accelerated in-
novation’ capabilities and the ability to combine these with the rapid
scaling-up to high volumes at low cost (Williamson & Yin, 2014).
Further studies have contended that some EMNEs, despite lacking key
strategic assets such as proprietary technology and global brands, have
developed ‘composition capabilities’ that enable them to compete suc-
cessfully by creatively combining ordinary resources to generate im-
pressive speed and eﬃciency and present superior price-value equa-
tions to customers (Luo & Child, 2015; Luo & Tung, 2017). The result is
the rapid emergence of EMNEs from global challengers to global leaders
(BCG, 2014; Horner, 2013; Kotabe & Kothari, 2016) who are increas-
ingly taking over lead ﬁrm positions in global value chains traditionally
dominated by DMNEs (He et al., 2017).
In a bid to further enhance their capabilities and improve their
positions in GVCs, many EMNEs have engaged in internationalisation in
order to obtain the ownership advantages they lacked (Kotabe &
Kothari, 2016; Lebedev, Peng, Xie, & Stevens, 2015; Tung, 2007, 2017;
Mathews, 2006; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Yang & Deng, 2017). It is argued
that the main motives behind EMNE investment in developed countries
and ‘south-north acquisitions’ in particular are to seek knowledge and
access and develop strategic assets (Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2012; Gaur,
Kumar, & Singh, 2014; Lebedev et al., 2015; Rabbiosi, Elia, & Bertoni,
2012; Yang & Deng, 2017). The argument was recently advanced fur-
ther by the concept of ‘liability of emergingness’ (Held & Berg, 2015;
Madhok & Keyhani,2012). Madhok and Keyhani (2012), for example,
viewed overseas acquisitions undertaken by EMNEs—who tend to
possess mainly ordinary resources but not proprietary advantages—as
acts of opportunity-seeking entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurial
alertness and learning agility has enabled EMNEs to transform their
capability portfolios and turn their ‘liabilities of emergingness’ into
‘assets of emergingness’. Nevertheless, many EMNE acquisitions in de-
veloped countries have distinctive features, often involving ‘light-touch’
post-acquisition integration strategies (Liu & Woywode, 2013) and
unique parent-subsidiary relationships in which the acquired sub-
sidiaries enjoy high degrees of decision-making autonomy (Awate et al.,
2015).
Taken together, the rising positions of EMNEs in GVCs, their unique
capabilities and ‘liability of emergingness’ in their venturing in devel-
oped countries may therefore indicate the existence of diﬀerent power
relationships in value chains (compared to those that had been reported
in DMNE-dominated GVCs). Here, we need to depart from the
structuralist view in which the agency of power typically entails an
authoritative or legitimated delegation from the GVC lead ﬁrms or MNE
headquarters (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008;
Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016; Mayer, Phillips, & Posthuma,
2017; Morrison et al., 2008; Ponte & Sturgeon, 2014; Sturgeon, 2002).
We feel that this should be complemented by ‘Resource Dependency
Theory’ (Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978), which argues that power relation-
ships are shaped by “resource criticality and the availability of alternative
providers of critical resources” (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Given the
diﬀerent resource bases played out in our research context, it is not
unreasonable to expect a unique power relationship to exist between
the EMNE—as the GVC lead ﬁrm—and its developed country acquired
subsidiary. This will have important implications for upgrading, which,
as we already discussed, is conditioned by power relationships.
In light of the above, our pursuit of a multidirectional under-
standing of the capability upgrading of EMNE-acquired overseas sub-
sidiaries necessitates a comprehensive investigation of the following
elements: product, process, functional and inter-sector upgrading; ﬁrm-
based learning, taking into account changes in behaviours/actions and
mutual learning; the power relationship between EMNE acquirers and
their acquired subsidiaries, and the EMNEs’ unique characteristics.
3. Research methods and context
3.1. Research methods
As the extant literature had not examined subsidiary capability
upgrading under emerging market acquirers, we took an inductive ex-
ploratory approach, using a single in-depth case study approach
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Ghauri, 2004; Welch & Piekkari, 2017). This suited
our aim to understand how and why EMNE subsidiaries can upgrade
their capabilities. We viewed the case study as a necessary ﬁrst step in
building a theory about the capability upgrading of EMNE-acquired
subsidiaries. As an exploratory research, our intention was not to
“generalise our ﬁndings to the entire population but to establish robust
ﬁndings and arguments for further study” (Hobday & Rush, 2007, 1340).
We took advantage of our unusual research access to the case study
ﬁrms—China’s Times Electric and its UK acquired subsidiary Dynex.
While Chinese ﬁrms are notoriously diﬃcult to access (Vukicevic,
2014), one co-author had a long relationship with Times Electric, while
another had previously met the Dynex CEO and had forged a re-
lationship with him. This gave us a rare opportunity to conduct ‘elite
interviews’ (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen,
2002) with senior managers and key engineers in both the acquirer and
subsidiary ﬁrms, producing rich data.
We focussed on the period between 2008 and 2015, with multiple
visits to both the acquirer and subsidiary sites. We believed a seven year
period to be suﬃciently long to uncover the upgrading in Dynex and its
underlying learning process (Birkinshaw, Ambos, and Bouquet (2017),
for example, investigated ﬁve years of boundary spanning activities
undertaken by corporate executives). The data were mainly collected
from primary interviews and publicly available secondary sources. We
gathered as much public data as possible on our case ﬁrms, including
annual ﬁrm reports, news archives, and media reports in both English
and Chinese. We collected over 900 pages of documents from secondary
sources, which were useful to build a detailed picture of the case study
ﬁrms, and helped to develop an in-depth understanding not only of the
subsidiary’s capability upgrading but also of the strategy adopted by
Times Electric (the acquirer ﬁrm). Dynex’s annual reports and news
archives, in particular, provided very rich information on the impact
that Times Electric had on it, and provided much of the evidence of the
upgrading that had occurred in Dynex after the acquisition. Unlike He
and Khan (2015) who had mainly used part of their secondary data to
present evidence of upgrading in a subsidiary, we took a fresh approach
to the actual process—how and why it happened—and provided theory
development illustrating the role played by the EMNE acquirer ﬁrm as a
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source of knowledge and learning in the upgrading process. In addition,
this paper also covered a longer time period and collected much richer
interview data in order to unravel the subsidiary’s capability upgrading
and the underlying learning process.
Having gained substantial knowledge of the two ﬁrms and of the
acquisition, we carried out face to face semi-structured interviews with
senior managers from both ﬁrms. The interviewees were identiﬁed via
personal relationships and by applying the snowballing technique
(Patton, 1990). All together, we conducted 14 interviews with 12 dif-
ferent managers and lead engineers from both the parent and subsidiary
ﬁrms from 2013 to 2017, amounting to 720 min of recordings (see
Table 1 for details). Each interview lasted, on average, just over 50 min.
In those instances in which we felt it necessary to probe further, these
were followed up by further email exchanges between the authors and
the interviewees. In addition, we held a two-hour focus group discus-
sion with about 20 managers and engineers from the parent ﬁrm during
their training stay in Dynex in 2015. Those data collection methods
were complemented by multiple site visits to both the acquirer and
subsidiary ﬁrms and the staﬀ canteens. Our primary data collection
phase lasted about four years—from 2013 to 2017—which favourably
compares to other case study research published in leading interna-
tional management journals (e.g., four months in Johnson and Duxbury
(2010); under a year in Balogun and Johnson (2004), three years in
Piekkari, Vaara, Tienari, and Säntti (2005)).
The interviews were carried out with the aid of an interview guide
(Kvale, 1983). The interview protocols were developed based on the
initial theoretical considerations regarding subsidiary upgrading
(Kvale, 2007). However, the interview guide evolved as the study
progressed and was modiﬁed following each of the interviews, thus
ensuring the relevance of the questions to the main topic of the study
and increasing the internal validity of the data (King, 2004). The ﬂuid
and ﬂexible nature of semi-structured interviews allowed unexpected
and emerging themes to surface. Mindful of the possible transfer of
various kinds of knowledge (technological, market, etc.) from the ac-
quirer that may have led to the upgrading of the subsidiary, the earlier
questions included the generic changes that Times Electric brought to
Dynex since the acquisition and Times Electric’s role in bringing in such
changes. The interviewees were also asked to comment on the other
party’s competences and changes to them, the relationship between the
parent and the subsidiary, and diﬀerences in management style. As time
progressed and after some initial data analysis, we delved deeper into
ﬁrm-level learning with questions about knowledge ﬂow and its man-
agement, ﬁrm strategies, parent-subsidiary relationships and the role
played by the acquirer ﬁrm in the subsidiary’s capability improvement.
In the Appendix A, we attach two typical interview guides, one for the
early stage and the other for later stage; of course, they only served as
guides, as the questions did vary across interviewees and there were
many instances in which we needed to probe further.
We greatly beneﬁted from the interviewees’ willingness to share
their experiences and views. The interviews were tape-recorded, then
transcribed and carefully reviewed immediately after they had been
conducted. This was done to ensure that each interview was still fresh
in the researcher’s mind and could be accurately recalled.
We applied well-established qualitative data analysis protocols such
as content analysis (Drisko & Maschi, 2016; Gaur & Kumar, 2017;
Ghauri, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994). This involved an iterative
process of theory development and analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner,
2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Welch & Piekkari,
2017) and “cycling between emergent data, themes, concepts and dimen-
sions and the relevant literature” (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Data
analysis beneﬁts from a coding process that involves “devising a con-
sistent system for indexing the whole of a data set according to a set of
common principles and measures” (Mason, 2002, 150). Part of the data
were coded according to the conceptual background. For example,
evidence of subsidiary upgrading was coded into product, process,
functional or inter-sector upgrading depending on its nature. Coding for
other data was less straightforward and this was particularly the case
when we were seeking to understand how and why upgrading took
place at Dynex. We followed Gioia et al. (2013) in allowing terms and
categories, usually as reported by the informants, to emerge and then in
reducing any germane categories to a manageable number. This process
produced about 80 ﬁrst-order categories. We then moved to second-
order themes by searching for similarities and diﬀerences between the
ﬁrst-order categories. The relevant data were drawn together “in a bag
or slice of data” (Mason, 2002) to be further explored. This was followed
by a process of data organisation, retrieval, and interpretation, which
involved mapping the range and nature of the phenomenon, ﬁnding
associations, and seeking explanations (e.g., Miles & Huberman, 1994;
Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, &
Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011). At this stage of the data analysis, we
consulted the literature on the topic and considered the data and the
extant literature in tandem (Gioia et al., 2013; Welch et al., 2011). A
further distillation of the emergent second-order themes ﬁnally gener-
ated a few ‘aggregate dimensions’. We present our data structure in
Appendix B. Continuously cycling between the emergent data, cate-
gories, themes, and dimensions, and the relevant literature enabled us
to uncover relationships between our conceptual building blocks (Gaur
& Kumar, 2017; Welch & Piekkari, 2017) and, gradually, the upgrading
process became clear (Fig. 1).
3.2. The case study ﬁrms
The acquisition of Dynex in the UK by China’s Times Electric re-
sembled many other acquisitions by EMNEs in developed countries: the
acquired ﬁrms are usually smaller but hold renowned brands and are
technology leaders in their sector, whereas the acquiring ﬁrms are
Table 1
Information about interviews.
Date of Interview Place Interviewees Length (mins)
16/8/2013 Zhuzhou, China Director of Strategy and Development, Times Electric − Interviewee 1 60
7/10/2014 Lincoln, UK CEO, Dynex − Interviewee 2 30
10/9/2015 Lincoln, UK CEO, Dynex − Interviewee 2 25
23/11/2015 Lincoln, UK CEO, Dynex − Interviewee 2 70
Sales and Marketing Director and Board Member, Dynex, − Interviewee 3 70
Deputy R&D Director, Dynex- Interviewee 4 50
HR Manager, Dynex, − Interviewee 5 40
IGBT Wafer Fab Process Technology Manager, Dynex − Interview 6 60
4/7/2016 Zhuzhou, China Vice Chief Engineer, Times Electric − Interviewee 7 50
Board Secretary, Times Electric − Interviewee 8 50
Adviser to General Manager, Times Electric − Interviewee 9 50
Director of the Semiconductor Business Unit, Times Electric − Interviewee 10 60
Vice Director of IGBT Manufacturing Centre, Times Electric − Interviewee 11 45
18/3/2017 London, UK Deputy General Manager, Times Electric − Interviewee 12 60
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usually larger but tend not to own global brands and superior pro-
prietary knowledge.
Dynex was established in 1956 in Lincoln, UK, and, over time, had
become a global supplier of specialist, high power semiconductor pro-
ducts. It manufactured some of the world’s ﬁrst silicon based semi-
conductor components and, at the time of the interviews, designed and
manufactured high power bipolar discrete semiconductors, power
modules, including insulated-gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs) and high
power electronic assemblies. During the 1980s and 1990s, the ﬁrm
changed hands a few times until it was purchased by a Canadian group
and renamed Dynex. At its peak, Dynex had about 400 employees and
ﬁve product lines with no synergies between them (CEO, Dynex). The
ﬁrm hence lacked a clear focus, and was then forced to narrow its line
to semiconductors. The workforce shrank to about 140. Being in an
investment-hungry industry, Dynex found it diﬃcult to survive in-
dependently and ran into ﬁnancial troubles. By 2004, it was very close
to bankruptcy and its senior managers recognized that new share-
holders were required to support investment in the future of the
business.
Based in Hunan, China, Times Electric was listed on the Hong Kong
stock exchange and was majority owned by CSR China, one of the
largest global railway equipment suppliers. Quoted in Shanghai and
Hong Kong, CSR China was majority owned by the Chinese
State–owned Asset Supervision and Administrative Commission. By
2015, it was one of the two largest railway equipment suppliers in the
world, along with its home rival CNR China. CSR China invested
heavily in innovation, spending €431 M on R&D in 2013 (European
Union, 2014), 11th in the Industrial Engineering sector, behind only a
handful of household names such as Volvo, Caterpillar, and ABB. In
2015, it merged with CNR China to form CRRC Corporation Limited.
Table 2 provides some basic information about Times Electric and
Dynex before the acquisition.
Times Electric was engaged in the research, development, manu-
facture and sales of locomotive train power converters, control systems,
and other train-borne electrical systems, as well as the development,
manufacturing, and sales of electric systems for urban railway train
Fig. 1. Learning and upgrading in EMNEs’ acquired
subsidiaries.
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systems. It was a key force behind the design, engineering, and pro-
duction of Electric Multiple Units (EMUs) that ran at speeds of 350kph
on China’s high-speed railways. Having established its core competence
in propulsion and control technologies in the railway industry, Times
Electric pursued a ‘Concentric Circles’ strategy, aimed at further im-
proving its competency in propulsion and control and diversifying into
other sectors using that core competency as a common platform tech-
nology. This saw them successfully entering into the urban transit,
electric vehicle, and renewable energy sectors. Like other leading
Chinese ﬁrms, Times Electric had accelerated its internationalisation in
recent years. The last few years had seen a series of major overseas
investments made by Times Electric, including its acquisition of Dynex
and SMD in the UK in 2008 and 2015 respectively.
Before the acquisition of Dynex, Times Electric and CSR China were
already the main suppliers of China’s railway equipment. However,
despite being the leading player in electric traction drive technologies
in China, Times Electric had been unable to design and manufacture its
own IGBT modules and silicon chips—the ‘heart’ of electric traction
drives—and had to rely on imports. This had constrained not only
Times Electric and CSR China’s railway expansion, but also their
‘Concentric Circles’ strategy and their internationalisation eﬀort. Once
it had learned that the then Dynex owner wanted to sell the ﬁrm, it had
acted quickly and completed the acquisition in 2008.
4. Case analysis
Dynex was subjected to many changes since its acquisition. With
ﬁnancial support from Times Electric, Dynex built a new £12 M R&D
centre to develop IGBT technology. Times Electric also helped Dynex
secure ﬁnance to build two new IGBT production lines funded with a
£12 M investment, upgrading its production facilities. The acquisition
also gave Dynex much improved access to the Chinese market, which
was relatively less aﬀected by the global ﬁnancial crisis. All of these
changes proved to be transformational for Dynex. The subsidiary’s sale
revenues grew from US$30.2 million in 2007 to US$39.6 million in
2012, unfavourable economic environment notwithstanding. The
number of employees grew from fewer than 250 in 2008 to 315 in
2013.
Below, we provide detailed evidence of the capability upgrading
that took place at Dynex. In so doing, we seek to provide a compre-
hensive picture of the overall impact the acquisition has had on Dynex.
4.1. Evidence of capability upgrading
4.1.1. Process upgrading
After the takeover, Dynex was able to upgrade its production fa-
cilities with signiﬁcant help and investment from Times Electric. In
2011, Dynex completed a £12 million project to install two new 6-inch
IGBT wafer fabrication production lines to upgrade and expand its
fabrication facility for silicon chips to be used in IGBT modules. The
new IGBT lines replaced Dynex’s existing 4-inch production line that
had originally been set up over 20 years earlier. This increased tech-
nological ability enabled Dynex to increase its production capacity
tenfold, resulting in large volume chip manufacturing for the ﬁrst time
in the ﬁrm’s history. The result is evidenced by a 155% increase in the
ﬁrm’s 2010 IGBT module revenue to US$9.2 million in 2011, and a
further 63% one to US$15 million in 2012 (Dynex, 2012, 2013). Dynex
reckoned that the advances in its power module assembly and test
techniques led to improved reliability and robustness, and improved
manufacturability, laying down a basis for new products incorporating
the next generation of its IGBT and fast recovery diode chips (Dynex,
2012).
4.1.2. Product upgrading
Product upgrading was evident at Dynex. The 6-inch bipolar thyr-
istor wafer fabrication line installed in 2009, for example, helped the
ﬁrm increase capacity and extend the power rating of its i2 thyristor
products. The extension of the i2 range of thyristors continued with the
development of advanced thyristors that were taking the ﬁrm into a
new generation of high performance products (Dynex, 2013).
During the second half of 2011, Times Electric took over the pro-
duction of lower power (and hence lower margin) bipolar products
from Dynex. This enabled Dynex to concentrate its bipolar business on
the production of higher power, higher margin parts (Dynex, 2012).
Signiﬁcant progress was also made in developing more advanced high
voltage IGBT and fast recovery diode chips. The resulting new products
oﬀered lower operating energy losses and increased power capability,
rendering them suitable for both railway and electric grid applications
(Dynex, 2012).
4.1.3. Functional upgrading
The takeover by Times Electric brought changes to the way R&D
was undertaken in Dynex. A careful examination of Dynex’s annual
reports suggests that, prior to the acquisition, the ﬁrm had struggled to
maintain strong and consistent R&D investment. The takeover did not
only see the establishment of a brand-new R&D centre but also sig-
niﬁcant and stable growth in R&D expenditure at Dynex, increasing
from 3.9% of revenue in 2009 to 10.6% in 2012 (Dynex, 2012, 2013).
The R&D team increased from 12 in 2008 to about 50 in 2014. This
expanded R&D team not only developed new sophisticated products
such as the 3300 V IGBT modules, but also made signiﬁcant advances in
the fundamental research for thyristors and IGBT technology. Re-
sponding to Times Electric’s request, Dynex also made progress in de-
veloping new power devices on a new Silicon Carbide base material
that oﬀer superior performance and have a wide range of applications
(IGBT manager, Dynex). The growing R&D expenditure not only helped
sustain and strengthen Dynex’s research and development activities,
but also reﬂected Times Electric’s ambition to develop Dynex into a
world leading industrial high power semiconductor supplier.
4.1.4. Inter-sector upgrading
Historically, Dynex’s power modules had found their applications
mainly in the marine drive and industrial power control sectors. The
acquisition by Times Electric, however, meant that Dynex was in-
creasingly applying its existing competences in new sectors, in ac-
cordance with its new parent ﬁrm’s ‘Concentric Circles’ strategy. We
have earlier reported the staggering growth in IGBT modules, which
was itself a result of Dynex’s shift to the railway industry.
The last few years also saw the strategic focus of the ﬁrm’s R&D
activity expand to the development of new applications in the low
carbon sectors such as renewable energy, smart grids, and electric cars.
For example, with the support of its parent ﬁrm, Dynex started to
produce IGBT and diode processes and designs using the 8-inch silicon
production base recently established in Times Electric. The intention
was to increase capacity and ability in order to service higher volume
markets such as electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar power sys-
tems (Dynex, 2012). Such expansion would clearly not have been
possible without the capabilities, resources, and spread of the parent
ﬁrm.
Table 2
Basic ﬁrm information before the acquisition.









Times Electric 154.2m 67.6m 77m 2830
Dynex 14.1m 3.3m 0.6m 250 (in year
2008)
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4.2. Subsidiary capability upgrading and the role of EMNE acquirers
The evidence presented above demonstrates that Dynex underwent
signiﬁcant upgrading in various areas since its acquisition. In this sec-
tion, we pay particular attention to how this happened and, especially,
to the role played by the EMNE acquirer in the process.
4.2.1. EMNE acquirer ﬁrms as impellers
In this acquisition, Times Electric’s knowledge-seeking motive
clearly manifested itself in the establishment of a state-of-art 8-inch
IGBT wafer and module production base in Hunan in 2015 with en-
gineering support from Dynex. However, Times Electric was also keen
to combine Dynex’s technology capability in IGBT and its own manu-
facturing advantage and knowledge of the Chinese railway system
(senior managers of Dynex and Times Electric). Shortly after the com-
pletion of the acquisition, the President of Times Electric said:
“We expect Dynex to develop high power technology, R&D cap-
ability, and proven reliability and quality, thus to complement the
rapidly growing manufacturing capability and power electric system
know-how of Times Electric” (Dynex, 2008).
However, there was a signiﬁcant obstacle as, before the acquisition,
Dynex had little experience in the railway sector. Then, Dynex’s IGBT
modules had mainly been used in marine drive and industrial power
control. The railway market, however, attaches great importance to
reliability and has special requirements in areas such as power loss and
electricity current balance (senior managers, Dynex). This exposed a
signiﬁcant capability gap: Dynex needed to learn to design and manu-
facture IGBT modules speciﬁcally for the railway market and meet its
special requirements.
Times Electric played a key role in enabling Dynex to modify its
IGBT modules for the railway market. Firstly, it helped invest in the
new £12 million 6-inch wafer fabrication production lines, which not
only signiﬁcantly expanded Dynex’s manufacturing capacity but also
improved the reliability and robustness of its products. Secondly, being
lead ﬁrms in the railway equipment global value chain, CSR China and
Times Electric had the ability and authority to set speciﬁc requirements
for the IGBT modules produced by Dynex. They also arranged and
monitored ﬁeld trials for their application in China’s railway locomo-
tives and provided vital knowledge on how to improve product func-
tionality through testing. In other words, CSR China and Times Electric
set parameters for the manufacturing process in terms of what was to be
produced and how (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b). Thus, the Chinese
parent not only enabled Dynex to vertically extend its business but also
put the acquired ﬁrm in a direct downstream line from the regulator,
creating, in eﬀect, ‘monopolized synergies’ that competitors would have
found very diﬃcult to match.
Last but not least, the newly-established parent-subsidiary re-
lationship provided Dynex not only with vital access to the Chinese
market but also with key customer knowledge to improve its products,
all of which had not been available to Dynex as an independent ﬁrm.
Before the acquisition, Dynex had found it diﬃcult to penetrate into the
railway market because of the latter’s emphasis on reliability and be-
cause it had lacked previous reference and reputation in this market
(senior managers of Dynex and Times Electric). Its CEO said in inter-
view:
“The railway sector is very demanding in terms of reliability and
costs. And we could not enter the railway sector without Times
Electric because the other main railway ﬁrms are already so tied up
with existing IGBT manufacturers that they could not give us space
or time to do the qualiﬁcation. So that was something that has been
enabled by the relationship with Times Electric.” (Interview)
Being an independent ﬁrm had also meant that, in the past, Dynex
had found it diﬃcult to obtain product feedback to implement any
potential product improvements and adaptations; customers would
only report whether or not a product was acceptable, without providing
any further details. Leading global ﬁrms such as Inﬁneon and
Mitsubishi had their own system ﬁrms or train ﬁrms to which they
could sell products and from which they could get feedback. Becoming
part of Times Electric created a critical ‘internal market’ (IGBT man-
ager, Dynex) for Dynex to receive that feedback, which helped it design
particular applications and improve the quality of its manufactured
components (senior managers of Times Electric). The acquisition
therefore gave Dynex an ideal platform from which to apply its tech-
nologies in the expansive Chinese railway market and beyond, enabling
it to further improve its technologies. The ﬁrm’s IGBT Wafer Fab
Process Technology Manager commented in the interview:
“With Times Electric, it was a close enough relationship for us to get
completely the information of what problems our product had for
the application. We were able to give them component, they tested
them, tried them and we could go over there and actually see that
problems they had. That was a completely diﬀerent scenario to the
way we used to work.… I think because of that we now have a much
better product and it has been better tested in its application. … We
would not have learned what the problem with that product was without
that relationship” (emphasis added).
4.2.2. EMNE acquirer ﬁrms as co-learners
Compared to global leading ﬁrms such as Inﬁneon and Mitsubishi,
Dynex had been a small power semiconductor player. Times Electric
and CSR China wanted to signiﬁcantly enhance its capability so that it
could compete with global leading players at least in the Chinese
market (senior managers of Dynex and Times Electric). Part of the
strategy involved signiﬁcantly expanding Dynex’s R&D team. In a
ceremony to celebrate the completion of Dynex’s new R&D centre,
which—following its integration with Time Electric’s existing R&D
group—had become CSR China’s global R&D centre, Mr. Changhong
Zheng, the then President of CSR China, emphasised that the centre
would focus on developing new technologies and products to expand
the high power semiconductor product portfolio of both Dynex and
Times Electric, noting that the products were key to a wide range of
sectors that CSR China and Times Electric wished to pursue; i.e., rail-
ways, electric vehicles, wind power generation, solar power, electric
power grids, and high voltage power conversion (Dynex, 2011).
This expectation for Dynex to signiﬁcantly expand and enhance its
technological competence meant that Dynex was required to not only
focus more on advanced technological areas, but also to develop new
products in much broader areas. A Dynex senior engineer commented:
“Really, the business strategy has changed from a small ﬁrm trying
to do niche products to a broad-based ﬁrm that really wants lots of
technologies. We are starting to work now in R&D on products that
we would never have done before.” (IGBT manager, Dynex)
Although this strengthened the competency-creating mandate, it
also exposed a capability gap, particularly with regard to the global
leaders. In 2015, Dynex’s CEO admitted that
“As a ﬁrm, we are still very much in a catch-up situation for the
power semiconductor. We are not as strong as many of our com-
petitors. So we have got a degree of catch-up.” (Interview)
To address that capability gap, Dynex and Times Electric had to, for
example, work together to qualify the IGBT modules for the Chinese
railway market, which generated a mutual-learning process in which
the ﬂow of information became increasingly recursive and multi-
directional. Dynex’s CEO, for example, reﬂected that the ﬂow of
knowledge between the subsidiary and parent ﬁrms had become more
two-directional and that there had been a change in the balance of the
ﬂow of knowledge, particularly after the establishment of the 8-inch
IGBT facility in Hunan in 2015.
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“So that continued, if you like, with the ﬂow being very much into
China in terms of showing them what to do, giving them processes
and stuﬀ like that…We have also started to get information coming
back now as they respond to ramping up that production line [in
Hunan].… in a lot of cases, they are ﬁnding things that are actually
very beneﬁcial to the overall process and design of the process,
design of the chips [on our side]… The other change is more related
to our power assemblies business. We lack a bit of information about
how to control the subunits. How to interface that subunit through
the control system into the main system? And it is how that control
interfaces and so on which is where our parent ﬁrm’s expertise and
core competency comes in. So, as we gradually move our business
more into this sector … we can get more support from our Chinese
ﬁrm. We are just starting to talk to them about how we can work
with them to develop new systems, new subsystems, and enter new
markets with that sort of support. So this is the ﬁrst time, really,
where we have begun to see that bigger ﬂow of technology coming
back into ﬁlling a gap that we don’t really have … So I think that is
one of the beneﬁts we are starting to see now, this relationship we
have, the win-win, the symbiotic relationship between Dynex and our
parent ﬁrm that the information [know-how] is becoming more and
more two directional.” [CEO, Dynex, emphasis added]
This symbiotic relationship started to create a favourable mutual
learning environment so that both the parent and subsidiary ﬁrms were
learning both from each other’s expertise and from third party orga-
nisations such as universities. Some of the new application areas that
Dynex was required to develop for its IGBT modules—for example,
electric vehicle and renewable energy—were also new to its parent
ﬁrm. Thus, both the parent and subsidiary ﬁrms had to experiment
together. Indeed, the joint R&D centre established after the acquisition
demanded that both parent and subsidiary ﬁrms share IP and devel-
opment costs (senior managers, Dynex and Times Electric). A ‘com-
munity of practice’ was being established; one in which the parent and
subsidiary ﬁrms joined forces and created a strong R&D team, dedicated
to electric vehicles, which was also working with a few universities in
the UK. Engineers from the UK and China held monthly reports and
quarterly reviews to reﬂect any problems and progress (IGBT manager,
Dynex). What we observe is the formation of “recursive, multidirectional,
mutual learning relations based in joint reﬂection and experimentation”
(Herrigel et al., 2013) between the acquirer and subsidiary. Despite
being in a nascent stage, this mutual learning relationship had already
seen the ﬁrms working both together and with external institutions to
produce a prototype of an electric vehicle and diversifying into in-
dustries beyond railway equipment.
4.3. Subsidiary upgrading and the underlying learning process
In this acquisition, Times Electric clearly had a strong knowledge-
seeking motive, as is the case for many other acquisitions conducted by
EMNEs in developed countries (Awate et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 2016).
However, it also had a keen interest in further developing Dynex’s
capabilities, which, combined with their own competencies, could help
them to enhance their position in the railway and other markets by
means of its ‘Concentric Circles’ strategy.
Therefore, quick and consistent eﬀorts were made to improve
Dynex’s capabilities in designing and manufacturing IGBTs for the
railway market. Times Electric also wanted to strengthen R&D in Dynex
so that the subsidiary could develop more advanced technologies to be
used not only in railway equipment but also in the other industries
(such as electric vehicles and renewable energy) that Times Electric and
CSR China wanted to penetrate. These strategies, however, exposed
signiﬁcant capability gaps between Dynex and global leading power
semi-conductor suppliers in terms of both the understanding of the
application industries and of the depth and breadth of technological
competency.
Our analysis revealed two important roles played by Times Electric
and CSR China to help Dynex to address such capability gaps. Firstly, as
lead ﬁrms in the railway equipment global value chain, CSR China and
Times Electric played the role of ‘impellers’ in Dynex’s upgrading pro-
cess. This was, for example, made manifest in the knowledge of the
railway system and of the propulsion and control subsystem they
brought to the subsidiary, which signiﬁcantly helped Dynex to under-
stand the application market of its IGBTs. As lead ﬁrms in the value
chain, they also set speciﬁc parameters for the subsidiary to comply
with and monitored the process (Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Noble, 1999;
Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b) in order to qualify Dynex’s IGBT modules
for the railway and related markets. Thus, similar to their DMNE
counterparts, EMNE lead ﬁrms, because of their positions in the value
chain, can also ‘impel’ upgrading in other value chain participants.
The ‘co-learner’ role played by Times Electric in Dynex’s upgrading
process was equally signiﬁcant and interesting. This could be seen in
the joint eﬀort they made in producing electric vehicles and diversi-
fying into the renewable industries. Being aware of the gaps between
Dynex’s existing capabilities and its expectations, Times Electric did not
just leave Dynex alone waiting for new capabilities to emerge. Rather, it
played an active role in reﬂecting, together with Dynex, on what
needed to be addressed and on how to address and achieve it. In the
words of one of Times Electric’s senior managers:
“We did not want to strip oﬀ Dynex and leave it empty. We treat it as
our asset and consider technological co-operation in order to fulﬁl
our strategic aims. We then use the strengthened capabilities [in
China] to help and feed Dynex’s development. So, in a sense, we
want both sides to improve together.” (Board Secretary, Times
Electric)
When we talked to senior managers and engineers in Dynex, it was
clear that the subsidiary was also increasingly eager to learn from its
parent ﬁrm. Furthermore, an expectation that such learning would
occur had been formulated and gradually solidiﬁed, establishing an
environment conducive to learning, in which mutual upgrading, driven
by the co-learner role, was not only possible but also probable. Over
time, a ‘symbiotic relationship’ and mutual learning environment was
established that facilitated a ‘recursive, multidirectional’ information
ﬂow and joint reﬂection and experimentation (Herrigel et al., 2013)
between the parent and subsidiary ﬁrms. Despite still being in the early
stage, this ‘symbiotic’ and mutual learning relationship was already
apparent in the qualiﬁcation process of Dynex’s IGBTs for the railway
market, the R&D agreement negotiation and both parties’ joint eﬀort in
electric vehicle R&D.
Via its ‘impeller’ and ‘co-learner’ roles, Times Electric successfully
induced signiﬁcant changes in Dynex’s behaviour, routines, and atti-
tudes, including its production processes, product focus, R&D man-
agement, and even risk attitudes, leading to the enhanced capabilities
that we reported in section 4.1. Dynex’s production processes went
through a signiﬁcant change after the acquisition as the result of the
new production facilities being put in place. The subsidiary was also
required to focus on high power, high value products instead of volume
manufacturing. In addition, eﬀorts were made to change Dynex’s R&D
management style from a relatively casual to a more structured one in
order to improve knowledge management and ﬂow (CEO, Dynex).
Engineers were encouraged to attend key power electronics workshops,
seminars, and conferences to ensure their continued professional de-
velopment (Dynex, 2013). Dynex’s attitudes towards risk also changed.
To integrate it into its fast innovation mode, Times Electric had to in-
duce changes in Dynex’s attitude towards risk and risk management.
Dynex’s CEO suggested that, despite being state-owned, its ultimate
parent ﬁrm, CSR China was not risk averse; rather, it took many cal-
culated risks. This was because of China’s unique working ethic and
eﬃciency, if any problem arose it would get ﬁxed right away; through
this strategy Dynex gained a great deal of knowledge.
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“It aﬀects Dynex as well and, actually, it is a beneﬁcial eﬀect be-
cause they are prepared to take the products that are coming from
our R&D area and put them into a close to real life application
quickly to try them out, to see if they work. And that is sort of their
qualiﬁcation process. They will take a small number, put them into
service and, if it is all right, they will move on and take a large
number. The process here [in the UK] is much, much slower. We will
take a few, we will run lots of test on them and, thus, we will get
independent views and lots of stuﬀ would go on before we dare to
put it into real life service. And it is the vertical integration that
allows [them] to do that because it means that the same ﬁrm that is
producing the locomotive is the same ﬁrm that is producing the
component that they are trying out. … We are learning and, maybe,
we will get a balance between the two [approaches].” (CEO, Dynex)
It should be noted that a range of supporting measures were put into
place by both parent and subsidiary ﬁrms in order to facilitate these
changes. We have already mentioned the signiﬁcant ﬁnancial invest-
ment made in Dynex since 2008. There have also been dedicated eﬀorts
by senior managers of both Times Electric (and CSR China) and Dynex
to help the subsidiary’s employees appreciate the parent ﬁrm’s strate-
gies, capabilities, and ambition and therefore enhance trust building
between the acquirer and the subsidiary. This, coupled with the parent
ﬁrm’s ‘light touch’ (Liu & Woywode, 2013) management of the sub-
sidiary (e.g., Times Electric not seeking domination of the Board, little
change to Dynex’s management team), helped to ease Dynex’s em-
ployees’ doubts on their Chinese parent ﬁrm and encouraged a stronger
motivation for knowledge sharing. In addition, regular exchanges of
engineers had become a routine (senior managers, Dynex and Times
Electric). Indeed, every year, a 40-strong team of managers and en-
gineers from CSR China are trained in the UK, spending a few weeks in
a renowned British university and a few more weeks in Dynex. Man-
agers and engineers from Dynex also visited the parent ﬁrm regularly.
Moreover, various eﬀorts were made to build trust and facilitate com-
munication between the Chinese and British engineers, including
dedicated team-building activities and social events. Dynex even in-
troduced Chinese food in its staﬀ canteen to encourage Chinese en-
gineers to stay at lunch time, thus creating opportunities for them to
engage with their local counterparts (senior managers, Dynex). Fur-
thermore, it is worth noting the role played by a few ‘boundary span-
ners’ (Reiche, 2011) in facilitating trust building and communication
between the acquirer and the subsidiary. The few senior managers sent
by Times Electric to work in Dynex—including the Sales Director and
the Deputy Director of the R&D Centre, for example, who spoke good
English and had a very good understanding of Western culture—did not
see themselves and were not seen by their Dynex colleagues as ‘con-
trollers’ from the parent ﬁrm, but as an integral part of the subsidiary
(senior managers, Dynex). Likewise, the CEO of Dynex had dealt with
the Chinese market for over 30 years and had a profound understanding
of the country and its culture.
5. Theoretical development
Up to now, we have revealed the learning process underlying cap-
ability upgrading in the subsidiary ﬁrm. The acquirer ﬁrm’s strategy
exposed signiﬁcant gaps (in terms of designing and manufacturing
IGBTs for the railway market, but also of the depth and breadth of
Dynex’s technological capabilities) between the subsidiary’s existing
capabilities and the acquirer ﬁrm’s expectations. To help Dynex address
these capability gaps, Times Electric played a dual, ‘impeller’ and ‘co-
learner’ role. The former involved the acquirer ﬁrm setting speciﬁc
product parameters and monitoring the processes, providing critical
product feedback, and bringing in key technological and market
knowledge. In its ‘co-learner’ role, however, we observed how Times
Electric engaged in joint reﬂection and experimentation with Dynex,
leading to the formation of a ‘symbiotic relationship’ and mutual
learning environment that facilitated a ‘recursive, multidirectional’ in-
formation ﬂow. Facilitated by a range of supporting measures, the ac-
quirer ﬁrm had, over time, induced signiﬁcant changes in the subsidiary
ﬁrm’s behaviours, routines, and attitudes, leading to enhanced cap-
abilities.
But what explains Times Electric’s ‘impeller’ and ‘co-learner’ roles?
Here, we note the ﬁrm’s distinctive EMNE characteristics and strategies
as well as the unique power relationship it had with Dynex. Rising fast,
initially in the Chinese and then in the global railway market, CSR
China and Times Electric exhibited distinctive EMNE characteristics; on
the one hand, it could be argued that they lacked core technological
competence in IGBT—the ‘heart’ of Electric Traction Drives; on the
other hand, they developed signiﬁcant capabilities (e.g., competence in
propulsion and control, fast innovation and the ability to apply their
competence in one area, such as railways, to diﬀerent but related areas
such as renewable energy) building upon ‘ordinary resources’ (Madhok
& Keyhani, 2012). These capabilities, along with the Times Electric’s
knowledge of the railway system and of the Chinese market, may not
have represented superior technologies, but were critical and com-
plementary to Dynex’s IGBT capabilities and, once transferred, led to
the upgrading of the subsidiary. In addition, as lead ﬁrms in the global
railway value chains, CSR China and Times Electric carried with them
signiﬁcant power both in setting and enforcing product parameters and
in monitoring compliance (Gereﬃ & Lee, 2016; Humphrey &
Schmitz,2002) for downstream players such as Dynex. Therefore, an
EMNE such as Times Electric, despite its lack of competency in the core
IGBT technology, could still ‘impel’ upgrading in Dynex because of its
GVC lead ﬁrm position and also of its ‘ordinary’ but critical and com-
plementary assets.
Despite CSR China and Times Electric’s GVC lead ﬁrm positions, the
power relationships between them and Dynex seemed to be more ba-
lanced than those reported in DMNEs dominated GVCs. This could be
explained by Resource Dependency Theory (Pfeﬀer & Salancik, 1978),
which argues that power relationships are shaped by “resource criticality
and the availability of alternative providers of critical resources” (Casciaro
& Piskorski, 2005). In our studied case, whilst Dynex owned the critical
IGBT technology and had access to the leading knowledge clusters in
the west, CSR China and Times Electric brought with them com-
plementary resources and capabilities (knowledge of the railway and
Chinese markets, fast innovation, etc.), but also coordination of activ-
ities and access to key actors in the value chain. In a diﬀerent dimen-
sion, Dynex struggled to ﬁnd a stable platform to apply its IGBT tech-
nology, whereas Times Electric could source IGBT from other suppliers
(although that had proven not to be a very stable approach and hadn’t
given any access to learning the technology itself). This indicates that
the power asymmetry typically exhibited between GVC lead ﬁrms and
other participants was here counterbalanced by the mutual dependence
between Times Electric and Dynex. In addition to that, CSR China and
Times Electric, despite being GVC lead ﬁrms, had to deal with the
‘liability of emergingness’ (Held & Berg, 2015) when they expanded
into the UK (for instance, in the early years of the acquisition, the
suspicion of Dynex’s employees towards their Chinese acquirer and
their ignorance of Times Electric’s particular knowledge strengths and
competencies). This induced a ‘more humble approach to learning’
(Madhok & Keyhani, 2012) on the side of Times Electric. Together, the
‘liability of emergingness’ and the relatively balanced relationship be-
tween Times Electric and Dynex were conducive to a mutual learning
environment and, therefore, to the ‘co-learner’ role played by Times
Electric in the upgrading process.
Our holistic approach has thus enabled us to establish a learning-
based understanding of subsidiary upgrading and unravel the under-
lying leaning process, which involves a chain of actions: the EMNE
ﬁrm’s strategies exposed capability gaps in its subsidiary; shaped both
by its unique strategies and capabilities and by its power relationship
with the acquired subsidiary, the parent ﬁrm played a dual, ‘impeller’
and ‘co-learner’ role, with a range of supporting measures, to help its
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subsidiary to address its capability gaps; this led to a behaviour/rou-
tines/attitudes change in the subsidiary and, ultimately, to enhanced
capabilities. In Fig. 1, we summarise the learning process underlying
subsidiary upgrading. Readers may refer to the data structure
(Appendix B) for the development of the inductively derived constructs.
The learning process and the chain of actions will certainly need further
reﬁnement; nevertheless, we believe that this is a promising direction
that deserves more attention and further research in order to open the
‘black box’ of the upgrading process (Hansen et al., 2016; Morrison
et al., 2008).
The fact that Times Electric, although lacking superior knowledge
and technology, impelled and induced capability upgrading in Dynex,
which did have superior knowledge in IGBT, is intriguing. This seems to
suggest that GVC lead ﬁrms having superior knowledge is not a ne-
cessary condition of upgrading. This is in contrast to the extant up-
grading literature, which focussed upon a one-way knowledge ﬂow
from DMNEs to local producers in developing countries (Marin &
Giuliani, 2011) and on an implicit theoretical reliance on the existence
of a superior knowledge on behalf of the value chain lead ﬁrms. Our
paper endorses the view that, in the upgrading process, the ﬂow of
knowledge is multidirectional (Herrigel et al., 2013), and that mutual
learning plays a signiﬁcant role in subsidiary upgrading in addition to
the ﬂow of knowledge from parent ﬁrms. The role that an EMNE parent
ﬁrm plays in subsidiary upgrading is therefore complicated: on one
hand, it is a knowledge contributor injecting complementary knowl-
edge into the upgrading process, while also being part of a mutual
learning process; on the other hand, the parent ﬁrm’s superior knowl-
edge is not a prerequisite for subsidiary upgrading as the former can
transfer complementary but critical knowledge and induce upgrading
via parameter setting and monitoring, but also jointly learn with the
subsidiary. Ultimately, what really matters is whether changes are in-
duced in the subsidiary’s behaviour/routines/attitudes (in our case,
changes in Dynex’s risk attitudes and R&D management, for example).
This paper therefore calls for a re-examination of the extant upgrading
literature’s theoretical reliance on the existence of a superior knowl-
edge on behalf of value chain lead ﬁrms.
Our analysis also points to the importance of investigating the
speciﬁcity of power relationships in value chains and MNE networks
taking into account ﬁrms’ characteristics and power sources. In parti-
cular, there is a need to recognize the diﬀerent sources of power
(Zheng, 2016) (e.g., power stemming from expertise and superior
knowledge, and power stemming from lead ﬁrm positions, ownership,
and authority) that diﬀerent players have and that shape the power
relationships and, ultimately, the upgrading process and outcomes.
6. Managerial implications and future research
6.1. Managerial implications
In developed countries, both governments and the public tend to
view EMNEs acquiring local ﬁrms simply as ﬁnance providers that have
little to oﬀer to the latter. Our analysis, however, demonstrates that
their roles could go much further than that, to also include those of
knowledge provider (for example, when Times Electric transferred its
knowledge of the train traction system to Dynex and helped the latter
develop and improve its IGBT modules for Chinese railways) and co-
learner (for example, when the acquirer and acquired ﬁrms jointly
experimented in the ﬁeld of electric vehicles). It is therefore important
for governments and businesses in developed countries to appreciate
the wider beneﬁts of EMNE investment and, in particular, the potential
depth and breadth of knowledge spillovers and mutual-learning op-
portunities.
This paper suggests that, in order to maximise these beneﬁts, it is
particularly important for subsidiaries to develop symbiotic relation-
ships with their parent ﬁrms as this would help to establish a mutual-
learning environment and facilitate the sharing of knowledge. In
addition, as the underlying learning processes are induced and shaped
by the parent ﬁrms’ strategies and characteristics, it would be helpful
for potential targets to understand their acquirers’ strategies and
characteristics to gauge the subsequent upgrading potential. It is also
important for managers in the west not to dismiss EMNE capabilities.
Although they suﬀer from the ‘liability of emergingness’, many EMNEs
do own complementary assets and competences that could turn out to
be very useful for ﬁrms in developed countries (e.g., Luo & Tung, 2017).
Perhaps there is a need for a more humble attitude from ﬁrms in de-
veloped countries, to recognize the EMNEs’ particular strengths and
capabilities and beneﬁt more from the latters’ acquisitions and invest-
ment.
6.2. Limitations and suggestions for further research
Its contributions notwithstanding, this study is limited by its single
case prism. Time Electric and CSR China held global value chain lead
ﬁrm positions and had signiﬁcant technological competencies; features
that may not be shared by other EMNE acquirers. Future studies could
build on our ﬁndings and undertake a wider study to examine multiple
EMNE subsidiaries from diﬀerent industrial settings. Still, this paper
demonstrates that there is a pressing need to understand the capability
upgrading of EMNE- acquired subsidiaries in developed countries. In
addition, given the distinctive characteristics of EMNEs (Ramamurti,
2012) and the possible new governance structures and value chain re-
lationships in EMNE-led GVCs (He et al., 2017), it would be interesting
to compare the upgrading outcomes of EMNE subsidiaries in developed
countries with those of developed country MNEs subsidiaries, and ex-
amine how they are shaped by diﬀerent governance structures and
value chain power relationships.
We urge future research to pay closer attention to the underlying
learning process in their investigation of upgrading. In particular, in
line with Herrigel et al. (2013), we call for future studies to look beyond
one-way knowledge transfer and consider mutual learning in the up-
grading process. We believe that future studies should also take into
account any ﬁrm characteristics that could help to shape the power
relationships between lead ﬁrms and other value chain participants
and, ultimately, the upgrading process and outcomes.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we examined capability upgrading in an EMNE-ac-
quired ﬁrm in a developed market and the underlying learning process.
The paper reveals that, despite its lack of superior knowledge, the
EMNE acquirer had a positive impact on its acquired ﬁrm’s learning and
capability upgrading. The results indicate that multiple types of up-
grading took place in the subsidiary and that these had been facilitated
by the parent ﬁrm playing a dual, ‘impeller’ and ‘co-learner’ role shaped
by its unique EMNE characteristics and strategy.
Our multidirectional conceptualisation of upgrading enables us to
unravel the important but complicated roles that can be played by
EMNE lead ﬁrms in the capability upgrading of their acquired sub-
sidiaries in developed countries. In particular, the paper reveals how
the EMNEs’ unique characteristics (e.g., their complementary cap-
abilities and more balanced GVC power relationships) shape the up-
grading process in their acquired, technological-advanced subsidiaries
in developed countries.
There is a dearth of research on what ‘power’ EMNE-lead ﬁrms
actually possess and exert (Sinkovics et al., 2014) despite the belief that
their rise will eventually lead to signiﬁcant changes in the governance
of global value chains (GVCs) (Henderson & Nadvi, 2011). Our paper
illustrates how, because of their GVC lead ﬁrm positions and unique
strategies and capabilities, EMNEs can exercise power and impel and
encourage subsidiary upgrading. It also contributes to the study of the
learning eﬀect and development impact of EMNE investment in de-
veloped countries, an area that has been so far little researched
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(Buckley et al., 2017; Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Luo & Tung,
2017; Rui et al., 2016), by showing how EMNEs may act as sources of
knowledge and learning and facilitate upgrading in their acquired
subsidiaries in developed countries. Our approach challenges the con-
ventional wisdom that tends to view EMNEs as mere learners and
beneﬁciaries of knowledge transfer from developed economies.
Our paper also emphasizes the need for a multidirectional con-
ceptualisation of upgrading. This requires scholars to look beyond the
governance and power relationship issues emphasised by the traditional
GVC approach, but to also consider organizational learning and ﬁrm
characteristics. This paper contributes to the upgrading and organiza-
tional literature by not only building a connection between ﬁrm-level
learning and upgrading outcomes but also by revealing how the
learning process is induced and shaped by ﬁrm strategies and char-
acteristics.
Finally, our research context is a departure from the extant litera-
ture on the internationalisation of EMNEs in developed countries, in
which the focus was on how EMNEs acquire strategic assets to com-
pensate their ownership disadvantages and enhance their competi-
tiveness (e.g., Gaur et al., 2014; Gubbi et al., 2010; Hansen et al., 2016;
Luo & Tung, 2007). It is also in contrast with the extant upgrading
literature, the focus of which was on upgrading in developing country
ﬁrms as a result of the knowledge possessed by DMNEs trickling down
in the global value chain (e.g., Khan & Nicholson, 2015; McDermott &
Corredoira, 2010). Our paper represents a healthy complementation by
studying how and why ﬁrms in developed countries can upgrade as the
result of being inserted into EMNE lead ﬁrms’ global value chains. This
paper therefore highlights the need for future research to avoid con-
textual bias on DMNEs and their subsidiaries. It also highlights the need
for future studies to distance themselves from the theoretical bias on
EMNEs being purely knowledge-seekers but to also consider them as
sources of knowledge and learning.
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Appendix A. Interview guides
Earlier stage interview guides for Dynex (acquired subsidiary):.
1. How and why did the acquisition happen? What were you looking for?
2. What are your comments on Times Electric’s competitiveness and capabilities?
3. What has been changed in Dynex since the acquisition? And how?
4. What is the role of Times Electric in the process?
Later stage interview guide for Dynex:
1. What are your comments on Times Electric’s management of Dynex?
2. Do you think Dynex’s competitiveness/capabilities have been improved since the acquisition? How? And what is the role of Times Electric?
3. How do you integrate knowledge (if there is any)coming from your parent ﬁrm to your ﬁrm?
4. What are the barriers to knowledge ﬂow and how did you overcome them? Any speciﬁc examples?
5. What coordination mechanisms have you used to facilitate knowledge ﬂow between the two ﬁrms?
6. How would you comment on your working relationship with the Chinese?
7. Can you talk about your experience of working with Chinese colleagues on speciﬁc projects?
8. How has the role of the R&D centre changed before and after the acquisition?
Earlier stage interview guide for Times Electric (Parent ﬁrm):
1. Why did you acquire Dynex? What did you want to achieve?
2. What is your future strategy? What is your plan for Dynex?
3. How has Dynex changed since the acquisition?
4. What is the role of Times Electric in the process?
Later stage interview guide for Times Electric:
1. How would you comment on the impact of the acquisition on Dynex?
2. How have you helped to further develop Dynex?
3. What measures have you taken to integrate Dynex into the parent network?
4. What are your comments on Times Electric’s management of Dynex?
5. Can you reﬂect on Times Electric’s relationship with Dynex? How do you manage that relationship?
6. What sort of coordination mechanisms have you used to facilitate knowledge ﬂow between the two ﬁrms?
7. What are the barriers to knowledge ﬂow and how did you overcome them? Any speciﬁc examples?
8. Can you talk about your experience of working with British colleagues on speciﬁc projects?
S. He et al. Journal of World Business xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
11
Appendix B. Data Structure.
Ist order categories 2nd order themes Aggregate Dimensions
Shift towards higher power, high margin products; Product upgrading Enhanced capabilities
New IGBT and diode chips;
Release of new thyristors.
New IGBT wafer fabrication line; Process upgrading
New bipolar thyristor wafer fabrication line;
The six-inch enables ﬁner geometry and diﬀerent types of process;
Leading to improved reliability and robustness.
Now developing silicon carbide, a new technology because CSR are moving into that
area;
Functional upgrading
(Dynex) now working in R&D on products that we would never have done before.
Developing IGBT for railways; Intersectoral upgrading
R&D shifted to new applications e.g. renewably energy and electric cars.
To compete quite heavily with Inﬁneon, Mitsubishi etc.; Strategic intention Firm strategies
To further develop Dynex’s IGBT technology and apply it to the Chinese railway
market;
Changed from a small ﬁrm trying to do niche products to a broad-based ﬁrm with lots
of technologies;
Times Electric wanting both sides to improve together
Railway being very demanding in terms of reliability and costs and forms; Gaps between existing
capabilities and expectations
Capability gap exposure
Dynex not being big enough to do them all;
Dynex still being a small ﬁrm relative to (the global leader);
Dynex formerly concentrating on some small speciﬁc areas;
Times Electric wanting lots of technologies;
Starting to work in R&D on products Dynex would never have done before;
Speed to improve because Times Electric are trying to grow a lot faster;
Dynex’s IGBTs having pre-proﬁled parameters, but needing much more narrow-
banded parameters
More hands-on or direction in terms of improving Dynex’s quality to match Times
Electric’s expectations;
Lead ﬁrm power Power relationships
Times Electric telling Dynex what the requirements for the silicon chips are.
Diﬃculty for Times Electric to develop IGBT in house; Mutual dependency Power relationships
Dynex struggling as a small, independent ﬁrm;
Dynex would not have learnt what the problem with a product was without its
relationship with Times Electric;
Dynex moving into silicon carbide because of CSR’s competence, but allowing them to
access the knowledge that exists in the West;
Dynex having to set standards a lot higher; Parameter setting and
monitoring
impeller
Dynex having to work to tighter tolerances and the customers expecting all of the
products to be good;
To be a supplier in that market place, Dynex needing to start working to CSR’s
procedures and quality standards;
Bigger ﬂow of technology coming back to Dynex; Knowledge transfer from
parentsA close enough relationship with CSR for Dynex to get the information of what
problems its product had;
Dynex, as an independent component manufacturer, never having that feedback;
CSR bringing in its technology, its experience of manufacturing and quality
management to Dynex to help.
Symbiotic relationship; Mutual learning and joint
reﬂection/experiment
Co-learner
Information becoming more two directional;
CSR really wanting Dynex to be an equal part of the whole ﬁrm;
CSR developing Dynex’s and its own expertise at the same time;
Joint R&D team for electric vehicles working together day in and day out;
Joint monthly R&D report and quarterly review;
CSR bringing in its converter technology to the UK and using the UK as the base to
develop that technology speciﬁcally for electric vehicles. This merging with what
Dynex can do with semiconductors;
CSR working very closely with the guys that used to be in China who are now in the
UK in terms of doing experiment or process trials;
Many joint papers being prepared for conferences;
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The 6-inch enabling ﬁner geometry and diﬀerent types of process, using better
technologies;
Change in production process Changes in behaviours/
routines/attitudes
Dynex moving away from some manual processes into more automatic processes;
Dynex having moved low power products to China to focus on high power products; Change in product focus
R&D in much broader areas;
Dynex R&D being more structured to improve knowledge management and ﬂow; Change in R&D management
CSR takinga lot of risks, but calculated ones; Change in risk attitudes
A ‘ﬁx it straightaway’ attitude mitigates the risks and this has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on
Dynex
Vertical integration allowing Dynex to do that because all being controlled by the
same ﬁrm;
£12 m new R&D centre; Financial investment Supporting measures
£12 m new IGBT fabrication lines.
Have to build trust to see the beneﬁt; Trust building
Senior managers helped employees to understand parent ﬁrm’s strategies, capabilities
and ambition;
They run an outstanding employee of the year award where they send four winners to
China and have all expenses paid;
They have given us bonuses and presents at Christmas … the feeling is good;
Key engineers (from Times Electric) were working here with me to understand the
process;
Training/staﬀ exchange
We visit our parent ﬁrm a lot;
We have put together a secondment programme to attract Dynex employees to go over
to our parent ﬁrm;
Yearly training programmes for CSR engineers in the UK;
Employing a Chinese staﬀ member in HR to facilitate communication; Communication
Becoming more open in information sharing;
Encouraging acceptance of mistakes;
Diﬃculty in communication. Doing it by email, conference calls and by visiting them a
lot;
Giving incentives to disclose problems;
Social committee at Dynex … to arrange social activities for Chinese colleagues;
Doing some team building exercises;
Dynex trying to improve its Chinese menu so that Chinese employees will stay for
lunch … to help integration;
Among eight Board members, only four from Times Electric; Light-touch management
Dynex enjoying a high degree of autonomy;
Times Electric taking a hands oﬀ approach;
Little change in management structure
The Director of the semiconductor business unit of Times Electric also being my boss
and a Dynex Director, thus being sort of inside the business and able can help us;
Boundary spanners
Dynex CEO, with a profound understanding of China, being a champion of and pivotal
to the relationship;
Having employed a Chinese staﬀ member in Dynex’s HR; her job being engagement
and communication between the British and Chinese;
Senior managers sent in by Times Electric seeing themselves as an integral part of the
subsidiary
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